

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S "GRID RESILIENCY PRICING RULE"

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Presentation Outline

- I. What did DOE do?
- II. What Does DOE's NOPR Say?
- III. How Is the NOPR Legally Deficient?
- IV. What Are FERC's Options?



I. What Did DOE Do?

DOE invoked its authority under the DOE Organization Act (42 U.S.C. § 7173) to propose a rule under the Federal Power Act

- DOE has not invoked this authority to propose a rule since 1985; has never proposed a rule under the FPA
- DOE's NOPR instructs FERC to "consider and take final action" within 60 days
 - Only FERC can finalize the proposal



DOE purports to identify a problem:

- "There have been significant retirements of fuelsecure generation"
- "DOE Staff Report warns that premature retirements of fuel-secure resources impose serious risks"
- "Wholesale power markets are not adequately pricing resiliency attributes of fuel-secure power"

DOE proposes a solution to its problem:

- "ensure that the reliability and resiliency attributes of generation with on-site fuel are fully valued"
- "ensure fair compensation in order to stop the imminent loss of generators with on-site fuel"
- Directs FERC to "issue a final rule requiring [RTO/ISOs*] to develop and implement market rules that accurately price generation resources necessary to maintain the reliability and resiliency" of the grid.

DOE's proposed "Reliability and Resiliency Rate"

- (A) "provides . . . for the (1) purchase of electric energy from an eligible [] resource and (2) recovery of costs and a return on equity for such resource dispatched during grid operations" and
- (B) "shall include pricing to ensure that each eligible resource is fully compensated for the benefits and services it provides to grid operations, including reliability, resiliency, and on-site fuel, and that each eligible resource recovers its fully allocated costs and a fair return on equity."

DOE's proposed "eligible resource"

- Located in an RTO/ISO*
- Able to provide essential energy and ancillary reliability services
- "Has a 90-day fuel supply on site enabling it to operate during an emergency, extreme weather conditions, or a natural or man-made disaster"
- Is not subject to state cost-of-service regulation

III. How is the NOPR Legally Deficient?

A rule based on the NOPR would be vulnerable to legal challenge under the Federal Power Act (FPA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

- FPA: FERC's authority to order changes to wholesale rates premised in finding current rates unjust and unreasonable
- APA: Proposed rule must provide opportunity for meaningful comment



III. How is the NOPR Legally Deficient?

Would a final rule be "unduly discriminatory"?

- Yes: Providing a special rate to only merchant-owned plants in some markets based on their fuel supply is unsupportable
- Maybe not: "Nothing in applicable law requires a rate standard to result in no disparate impact on any power resource whatsoever." D.C. Circuit, 2017.
 - FPA only prohibits undue discrimination when entities are "similarly situated"

III. How is the NOPR Legally Deficient?

Would a final rule be "arbitrary and capricious"?

- Probably not, assuming the final rule points to some evidence in the record for support.
 - Courts defer to FERC's technical, policy, and ratemaking judgments.



IV. What Are FERC's Options?

Might FERC finalize the NOPR?

- Powelsohn: "We will not destroy the marketplace . . . FERC does not do . . . energy politics." (Oct. 4)
- Does LaFleur's Retweet ("Great Message") = Endorsement?
- Chatterjee: wants to "correct market deficiencies that aren't properly valuing the attributes of these assets in a legally defensible manner that doesn't blow up the markets."

IV. What Are FERC's Options?

If FERC rejects the NOPR, what else might it do?

- Chatterjee said FERC might:
 - Issue its own NOPR based on the record
 - Issue a notice of inquiry / advanced NOPR
 - Request additional comments
 - Host a technical conference

